We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing, and where participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the dynamic environment. Price of anarchy has originally been introduced to study the Nash equilibria of one-shot games. Many games studied in computer science, such as packet routing or ad-auctions, are played repeatedly. Given the computational hardness of Nash equilibria, an attractive alternative in repeated game settings is that players use no-regret learning algorithms. The price of total anarchy considers the quality of such learning outcomes, assuming a steady environment and player population, which is rarely the case in online settings.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to understand the quality of outcomes of games and simple mechanisms in a dynamic environment. The Internet environment allows for running millions of auctions, tailoring the auctions to users in an unprecedented way. Typically, individual auctions provide very little value, costing only a few cents to a few dollars each, but such auctions provide the financial basis of much of the online economy, due to the amazing volume of interactions. For example, advertising provides close to 90% of Google's revenue [1] . The auctions are run continually, with dynamically changing participants and environments.
Classical economic analysis of the interactions of strategic agents assumes that players reach a stable outcome, optimizing their strategies to improve their utility (or designs mechanisms that are dominant strategy solvable). Dynamic environments, with high volume interactions of small individual value or cost, such as packet routing or ad-auctions, are better modeled as repeated games. Nash equilibria of the one-shot game correspond to stable outcomes repeated in each iteration, where the players have no regret for their choice of strategies, so analyzing the quality of outcomes in repeated games via the price of anarchy assumes that the auction reaches a stable outcome.
However, it is well known that in most games natural game play does not lead to equilibria, under any definition of "natural play". In fact, results on polynomial time computability of Nash equilibria of general games are mostly negative: finding equilibria is computationally hard (see [9] for a survey). Even with computational concerns aside, the game that the participants are playing at each time-step and the participants they are playing against, can change at any time without even the players realizing it or being able to form any distributional belief. Hence, even the concept of a Nash equilibrium is debateable in such an adversarially evolving setting, as the players don't even have the information necessary to calculate their expected utility at each time-step. Instead they observe their utility from the action they took or from any alternative action they could have taken only after the fact.
No-regret learning emerged as an alternate equilibrium model in a repeated-game setting. The full range of equilibria in a repeated game is very rich. In studying no-regret learning in games, we restrict ourselves to a generalization of Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, a particular non-equilibrium form of play that nevertheless captures the intuition that players learn to play appropriate strategies over time without necessitating convergence to a stationary equilibrium. A stationary distribution that is also a no-regret learning outcome corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, and in this sense, learning outcomes generalized Nash equilibrium. More importantly, there are several simple and natural bid-optimization algorithms that achieve the noregret property (e.g. regret matching [14] , multiplicative weight updates [2] ). Many advertisers use sophisticated optimization tools or services to optimize their bidding, such as Bluekai or AdRoll. Achieving small regret is a relatively simple expectation from these services.
Blum et al. [5, 6] apply regret-minimization to the study of inefficiency in repeated games, coining the term price of total anarchy for the worst-case ratio between the optimal objective value and the average objective value when players minimize regret. If in a sequence of play all players achieve the no-regret property, then the empirical distribution of strategy vectors is a coarse correlated equilibrium. The price of total anarchy is the ratio of the socially optimal welfare to the welfare at the worst coarse correlated equilibrium. Roughgarden [25] observed that many of the price of anarchy bounds are shown via a proof technique he called smoothness, and such proofs easily extend also to show bounds on the quality of coarse correlated equilibria, the price of total anarchy. Syrgkanis and Tardos [28] extend smoothness to simple mechanisms. However, this learning outcome analysis is based on the strong assumption that the underlying environment and player population is stable, while online environments are typically not stable.
In this paper, we study learning outcomes in games with a dynamically changing player population. No-regret learning aims to select strategies that do at least as well on the average over a sequence of steps as the best single strategy would have done with hindsight. In a changing game environment, we need a slightly stronger notion of regret minimization. With the game environment and population changing, a single best strategy with hindsight gives a really weak benchmark. Players, using good learning algorithms, should be able to adapt to the changing environment, and such adaptation may be very useful with the population changing over time. For example, in the context of routing games, a player with many route options, may want to adjust their route choices depending which part of the network is more congested.
Hazan and Seshadiri [15] formally introduced the stronger notion of regret that we will use (adaptive regret), considering the regret on the average over an interval of steps [τ 1 , τ 2 ), compared to a single best action over this interval with hindsight. However, the study of adaptive learning goes back much further, the work of Lehrer [20] and Blum and Mansour [4] studied generalizations of adaptive regret prior to [15] . Clearly short intervals will result in relatively high regret with any learning algorithm, but adaptive learning algorithms achieve regret o(τ 2 − τ 1 ), guaranteeing that regret grows sublinearly with the length of the interval. In essence, adaptive learning results by modifying classical learning algorithms to stop relying too heavily on experience from the distant past. We believe that such adaptive learning is a better model of behaviour of the bids using optimization tools. The current best adaptive learning algorithm is a natural adaptation of the classical Hedge algorithm, AdaNormalHedge, due to Luo and Shapire [21] . With this framework in mind, we ask the following main question:
How much rate of change can a system admit to sustain approximate efficiency, when its participants are adaptive learners?
Our Results We show that in large classes of games, if players choose their strategies in a way that guarantees low adaptive regret, this ensures high social welfare, even under surprisingly high turnover. To model a changing environment we consider a dynamic player population where between every pair of iterations each player leaves independently with a (small) probability p and is replaced by an arbitrary new player, implying that in expectation a p fraction of the population is replaced. The independent departure probability models churn in player population caused by effects outside the game. We make no assumptions on the sequence of arriving players, which can be chosen in an adversarial way. We use independence of departures for simplicity of presentation, and most of our results carry over to any process where the departing players are also chosen adversarially, subject to a constraint on the number of per-step replacements. This model of the environment is simple enough to allow a clean analysis, and allows arbitrary worst case shifts in player populations.
We show that learning behaviour ensures high social welfare in dynamic situations with high churn for three classes of games:
• In Section 4 we consider an item auction game with unit demand bidders, and show that learning by players ensures high social welfare even when the probability p of player departure is close to a constant (independent of the number of items or players, and depends only on the range of values players have). • In Section 5.2 we prove that in large dynamic congestion games earning by players ensures low social cost even with a dynamically changing player population. For example, when the costs are linear function of the congestion, we get a price of anarchy guarantee close to the 5/2 price of anarchy of the corresponding atomic congestion game, even if a 1/polylog(n) fraction of the n players are changing at each time-step.
• In Section 5.3 we consider allocation games with gross substitute valuations. Extending the results of Section 4, we prove that in large dynamic markets, learning by players ensures high social welfare even if a 1/polylog(n) fraction of the n players are changing at each time-step.
We achieve these results by developing a general technique (in Section 3) to show that in many games adaptive learners achieve high social welfare in dynamically changing environments. Our technique is based on the following three conditions:
1. All players are adaptive learners, i.e. they choose their strategies in a way that guarantees small adaptive regret on the outcome (for instance, using an adaptive learning algorithm). In deriving concrete bounds, we assume that players use adaptive learning algorithm with the best known bound of Luo and Shapire [21] or Blum and Mansour [4] . Our results deteriorate gracefully with weaker assumptions on the regret of learning. 2. The game repeated in each state (called stage) needs to have low price of anarchy. In particular, we need that the game satisfies a slight strengthening of Roughgarden's [25] smoothness property (or the smooth mechanisms property of [28]), which is typically used to prove price of anarchy guarantees. 3. There exists a sequence of solutions for the underlying optimization problem that is approximately optimal, and where on average each player's part of the solution is stable, i.e. doesn't change much over time.
With our model of players leaving the game independently with probability p at each step, on average each player is expected to participate in 1/p rounds of the game, which turns out to be long enough to learn good strategies. On the other hand, players will experience dynamic population changes, and with no assumption on arriving players, they will need to adapt to the changing environment. With a player population of size n, and each player being replaced with probability p after each step, we have np new players each step in expectation, so the population is constantly changing. We use an approximately optimal solution where each player's allocation is relatively stable as a benchmark for each player, a stable enough benchmark that will allow adaptive learners to learn how to play at least as well as this solution. We will be interested in understanding what value of p is needed to guarantee high social welfare. As a benchmark for our result, it is interesting to consider a simpler model of dynamic player population, where the departure or arrival of a player is announced to all players. We expect np new players each step, so in expectation there will be 1/(np) steps with no change at all. If all the changes are announced, players could be expected to restart their learning algorithms due to the change. If the stable period 1/(np) is long enough, we can use results for the total price of anarchy to guarantee high social welfare. Under standard no-regret learning algorithms each player will then have average regret approximately O( √ n · p).Hence, if we want the regret in the system to be at most an ǫ fraction of the optimal welfare and hence contribute only an ǫ to the inefficiency, we would require that p = O(ǫ 2 /n). In other words, the probability that any player changes in a period needs to be ǫ 2 /n, which is a tiny rate of change for large n.
Our results are stronger than what is implied by this argument in two ways. First, we do not assume that change is announced, rather, we take advantage of that fact that players using learning algorithms can adjust to the changing environment even without the announcement of the change. More importantly, our results allow a probability of change much higher than the required by the above argument. The resulting dynamic game will not have long periods with no change. Multiple players will be arriving and leaving at each step. We show that in many games, despite the constant change, there exists a good benchmark of the kind mentioned in the conditions above, where each player's individual solution or allocation is relatively stable. The rate of expected change np in our applications will turn out to be high, especially as the number of players increases. Roughly speaking, if we want the regret of the players to be an ǫ fraction of the optimal welfare, we will only require that p = O (poly(ǫ)/polylog(n)), where the constants depend on several parameters of each game at hand, but importantly depends only logarithmically in the number of players. Moreover, in some games we even give a bound that is independent of n. Hence, for any constant ǫ we allow almost a constant fraction of players to be changing at each period.
To apply the above outline to a game, we need to develop techniques for point 3 above: show that there exists a stable sequence of close to optimal solutions in our changing environment. Our first application is to the unit demand auction problem in Section 4 without requiring large supply of the items. After a change in one player, we can recompute the optimal solution by an augmenting path algorithm. Unfortunately, a single augmenting path can change the assignment of many (or even all) players, and hence in no sense is the evolving optimal solution stable. Such major changes can happen even if the player valuations are all 0 or 1. We develop an algorithm that finds stable solutions losing approximately only a factor of 2 from the optimum value. To illustrate the idea, observe that in the special case of 0/1 values, the optimum matching can change drastically with a change in one person's values, however a greedy matching is essentially stable, and has size at least 1/2 of the maximum possible. In Section 4 we extend this idea to give a stable solution to the unit demand auction problem, and use this algorithm to show that players using adaptive learning guarantee high social welfare in the item auction game with unit demand bidder even with a dynamically changing player population, allowing for a probability p of player departure that depends logarithmically on the range of values players have, and does not depend on the number of items or players.
In Section 5 we develop a general method for applying our framework for a large class of games. The main tool in this general framework is differential privacy. Differential privacy has been developed by Dwork et al [2006] [13] for (approximately) answering queries of databases of private information, while protecting the privacy of data. A differentially private response to a database query is randomized, and it requires that if two databases differ only in data about one individual, the probability that the response differs is very small. This requirement is very close to what we need for our stable solutions above: if there is a differential private with close to optimal solution, this immediately implies that the solution cannot change much as one person's data changes. We will be using a variant of the notion of differential privacy adopted to game theory, joint differential privacy [18] , as player i's share of any reasonable solution must depend on his/her own input, so a solution cannot be fully differentially private. In fact, the notion of marginal differential privacy of Kannan et al [17] seems even more appropriate, as it only requires that the output for each player j is differentially private in data of other players. In order to take advantage of differential privacy in the context of dynamically changing games, we need to overcome an important technical difficulty: with the output of the differentially private algorithm randomized, the natural measure of change in a sequence of such outputs is the sum of the total variation distances between adjacent pairs of distributions. We need to turn the sequence of output distributions with low total variation distance into a distribution of stable output sequences. We do this in Section 5 for joint differential privacy. For a marginally differentially private sequence, the sequence of global outputs is not stable enough, instead only the marginal distribution of each individual player is stable. In Appendix B we show how to adapt our analysis from Section 3 for this lower level of stability.
We illustrate our techniques using differential privacy with two applications. In Section 5.2 we use the differentially private algorithm of Rogers at al [24] for congestion games to prove that in large dynamic congestion games players using adaptive learning guarantees low social cost even with a dynamically changing player population.
In Section 5.3 we use differentially private algorithms of Hsu et al [16] for a matchings and allocations with gross substitute valuations to prove that in large dynamic markets players using adaptive learning guarantees high social welfare even with a dynamically changing player population. For simplicity of presentation, we focus on first price auctions in Sections 4 and 5.3, but our results apply also to second price auction (assuming no overbidding) as well as any hybrids of the two auction formats. In this setting we show, roughly, that if an allocation based (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism is used, then the price of total anarchy is ǫ close to max{1,µ} λ with a requirement that p = O(ǫ 5 /polylog(n)), as long as the market is large enough, in the sense that the supply of goods is large enough. The simultaneous first price auction is a (1/2, 1)-allocation based smooth mechanism. Thus even if approximately n/log(n) players are changing at each time-step, a constant inefficiency is guaranteed.
Related Work Price of anarchy as a measure of quality of outcomes in games was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [19] in 1999, and has grown into an important area of research with many great results. See for example Chapters 17 to 21 in the book [22] . With the computational difficulty of finding Nash equilibria [10] (see [9] for a survey) the relevance of price of anarchy for games without a natural means for the players to coordinate on an equilibrium came into question.
Regret minimizing players, as a natural model of learning in games, have been first introduced by Blum et al. [5] in the context of non-atomic congestion games, where no-regret learning behaviors converges to Nash equilibrium. Blum et al [6] suggested the study of learning outcomes in games where learning doesn't converge to Nash, and introduced the price of total anarchy for the worst case welfare at a limit point of no-regret learning compared to the socially optimum outcome, which form the coarse correlated equilibrium of the game. Roughgarden [25] introduced the framework of smooth games, showing that many of the known price of anarchy bound fit in this framework, and proved that smooth games also have small price of total anarchy. Syrgkanis and Tardos [28] extend smoothness to simple mechanisms. The smoothness framework has since been used in many areas, and it's shown to be robust in that the outcome quality implications also extend to Bayesian games [26, 27] . However, this learning outcome analysis is based on the strong assumption that the underlying environment and player population is stable.
There is a large literature of truthful mechanisms in a dynamic setting analogous to our dynamic player population model, where the goal is to truthfully implement a desired outcome with dynamically changing populations of users with private value. This line of work goes back to Parkes and Singh [23] in the computer science literature, but has been also considered much earlier with queuing models by Dolan [11] . In a more recent work Cavallo et al [7] offers a generalized VCG mechanism in an environment very similar to the one we are considering with departures and arrivals, and also provides a nice overview of work in truthful mechanisms in a dynamic setting.
Preliminaries
Games and mechanisms. We will consider a game played repeatedly, where the population of players is drifting over time. Let G be an n-player normal form stage game and assume that game G is played repeatedly T times. Each player i who participates in a stage game has a strategy space S i , a type v i ∈ V i and a cost function c i (s; v i ) that depends on the strategy profile and on his type. We will denote with C(s; v) = i∈[n] c i (s; v i ) the social cost, where s is a strategy profile and v a type profile. We will also analyze the case when the stage game is a utility maximization mechanism M , which takes as input a strategy profile and outputs an allocation X i (s) for each player and a payment P i (s). Players have quasi-linear utility u i (s; v i ) = v i (X i (s)) − P i (s) and the welfare is the sum of valuations (sum of utilities of bidders and revenue of auctioneer): W (s; v) = i∈[n] v i (X i (s)).
In all the games that we study the optimal social welfare problem can equivalently be defined as an optimization over a "feasible solution space" X n which involves no incentives. (e.g. in network congestion games it is the set of feasible integral flows, in a combinatorial auction setting it is the set of feasible partitions of items to bidders). We will overload the social cost and welfare notations, and for a feasible solution (or allocation) x ∈ X n we will use C(x; v) and W (x; v) to denote the social cost or welfare of the solution. We denote the optimal social cost or welfare for a type profile v, as Opt(v) = min x∈X n C(x; v) and Opt(v) = max x∈X n W (x; v) respectively.
Repeated game with dynamic population. A repeated game with dynamic population consists of a game G played for T time steps. Let P t denote the set of players at time t, where each player i ∈ P t has a private type v t i . Our model of dynamic population assumes that after each step every player independently exits the game with a (small) probability p > 0, so each player is expected to play the game for 1/p rounds. To keep our model simple, we will make the assumption that when a player exits, she is replaced by a new participant. This assumption guarantees that we will have exactly n players in each iteration, with a p fraction of the population changing each iteration. We make no assumption about the types of the new arriving players which can be picked adversarially. Most of our results could be extended to the case when the players that are being replaced is also chosen adversarially, subject to some constraint on the number of per-step replacements. We will denote this repeated game with Γ = (G, T, p). Similarly we will denote with M = (M, T, p) a mechanism that is played T times with player replacement probability p.
To simplify the notation, we will use player i to denote the current ith player, where this player is replaced by a new ith player with probability p each round. An alternate view of the dynamic player population is to think of players as changing types after each iteration with a small probability p. We will refer to such a change as player i switches or turns over.
Basic notation. For any quantity x we will denote with x 1:T the sequence x 1 , . . . , x T . For instance, v 1:T i will denote the sequence of types of player i produced by the random choice of leaving players and by the choices of the adversary.
We will consider two special classes of games, one welfare-maximization mechanism and one cost-minimization game:
First-price Auction Game. The auction games we consider are defined by a set of m goods, where we will assume that each good has a supply of s identical copies in each iteration. We assume for simplicity of presentation that the supply of each item is identical. The players are buyers who repeatedly participate in item auctions to buy copies of the items. The type of a buyer i is her valuation for sets of items. We will use v t i (A) to denote the valuation of the ith player for a set of items A in iteration t. We will assume, without loss of generality, that valuations are nonnegative and at most 1. Valuations over time are additive, which models perishable items, such as advertising opportunity, where a player will play to repeatedly win items in each period she is participating. We will focus the presentation on first price item auctions, where players bid on each item separately: if we have s copies of an item, the s highest bidders for the item get one copy each, and pay their bid. Our results also extend to second price auctions, as well as hybrid auctions.
In our first application (in Section 4) we will consider unit demand buyers without any assumption on the supply, that is, buyers whose value for any set of items in one iteration is their value for the best single item in the set. For the case of unit demand, we use v t i (j) to denote the value of an item j for buyer i at time t, so the player's value for a set A is v t i (A) = max j∈A v t i (j). We will assume that players will bid for at most one item at each iteration.
In Section 5.3 we consider large markets of first price item auctions with players that have more complex valuations satisfying the gross substitute property. We assume that players have no value for multiple copies of the same item.
Atomic congestion game. Our second application is the atomic congestion game. Assume that we have a set of congestible elements E (and let m = |E|), each element e has a latency function ℓ e (x), or cost, that is monotone non-decreasing. Given some selection of sets s i ⊆ E for each player i, the congestion in one element e is the number of players that have selected it:
x e (s) = |{i : e ∈ s i }|, and the cost of player i is then the sum e∈s i ℓ e (x e (s)).
A player's type v t i denotes the possible subsets of the element set she can select. For example, in the routing game on a graph, the strategy of a player i with source-sink pair (o i , d i ) is the choice of a path from o i to d i in the graph. We assume that a player's cost is infinity if her solution is not one of the selected sets.
Adaptive Learning in Dynamic Environments. We use the notion of adaptive regret introduced by Hazan and Seshadiri [15] . To formally define regret, and no-regret learning, we consider an arbitrary loss function. Consider a player who has N possible choices, the N strategies that the player has to choose from (often referred to as experts offering the player advice). In defining regret, and no-regret learning we are focusing on a single player, and hence we will temporarily drop the index i for the player from the notation. We use L(s, t) to denote the loss or cost of strategy s at time t. For a utility game, the loss is the difference between the maximum possible utility (which we assumed was 1 for all players) and the player's utility. We can assume without loss of generality that L(s, t) is a value in [0, 1], but make no assumption beyond this about the sequence of loss values. The goal of learning is to do at least as well over a period (or over the whole time sequence), as the best choice s * with hindsight. Note that even with a stable set of players the value L(s, t) will vary over time, depending of the strategies chosen by other players. [15] ) The adaptive regret of strategy sequence s 1:T in time frame [τ 1 , τ 2 ) is defined as:
Adaptive learning algorithms go back to the work of Lehrer [20] and Blum and Mansour [4] who even studied generalizations of adaptive regret. We say that a player satisfies adaptive learning if her regret R(τ 1 , τ 2 ) can be bounded by a function that is o(τ 2 − τ 1 ), that is, regret grows slower than linearly over time. Our results are affected by the quality of the learning algorithm players use, as with better learning we can tolerate higher turnover in the population of players. In the rest of the paper we will use the learning bounds of the recent work of Luo and Shapire [21] , who developed an adaptation of the classical Hedge algorithm, AdaNormalHedge that achieves small regret on all intervals. An alternate algorithm with a bound of the same type was also given in [4] . 
where N is the number of choices and loss is assumed to be in [0, 1] for all s and t.
In what follows, we will assume that all players in our repeated game use a learning algorithm with low adaptive regret, will use R i (τ 1 , τ 2 ) to denote the adaptive regret of player i over the period [τ 1 , τ 2 ]. For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that E(R(τ 1 , τ 2 )) ≤ (τ 2 − τ 1 ) ln(N τ 2 ) for all players and all time periods [τ 1 , τ 2 ). Our results would smoothly degrade if we assumed only that players achieve adaptive regret that is some other sublinear concave function of the interval's length (τ 2 − τ 1 ).
Solution-based Smoothness in Games and Mechanisms.
Smooth games were introduced by Roughgarden in [25] as a general framework bounding the price of anarchy in games. He also showed that smoothness based price of anarchy bounds extend to outcomes in repeated games when all players use no-regret learning.
We need a somewhat more general variant of smooth games, that compares the cost or utility resulting from a strategy choice to the social welfare of a specific solution, rather than comparing to the social optimum. For two strategy vectors s and s * we use (s * i , s −i ) to denote the vector where player i uses strategy s * i and all other players j use their strategy s j . Definition 2.3 (Solution-based smoothness). A cost-minimization game G is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to a solution x, if for some λ > 0 and µ < 1, for any type profile v, for each player i there is a strategy s * i depending on his type v i and her part of the solution x i such that for any strategy profile s
Note that, when x is the optimal solution, we recover the traditional examples of smooth games, as the deviating strategy s * usually depends on other players' types through his part of the optimal solution x * i (v). A game that is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to the optimal solution x * (v) is (λ, µ)smooth in the sense of Roughgarden's [25] , and the game has price of anarchy bounded by λ/(1−µ), and the average social cost of no-regret learning outcomes is also bounded by λ/(1 − µ)Opt. More generally, Theorem 2.4. If a game is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to a solution x, then at any Nash equilibria of the game, as well as at any no-regret learning outcome, the expected cost is at most λ 1−µ C(x; v). Syrgkanis and Tardos [28] give a related definition for smooth mechanisms assuming quasilinear valuation for all players. Again, we define a mechanism smooth with respect to a solution x, and allow the choice of strategy s * to depend on the player's part of the solution x i and his type v i . More formally, we will use the following definition. Definition 2.5 (Solution-based smooth mechanism). A mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to a solution x for some λ, µ ≥ 0 if for any valuation profile v for each player i there exists a deviating strategy s * i depending on v i and x i such that for all strategy vectors s,
where R(s) = n i=1 P i (s). M is a solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism if the latter holds for any feasible solution x ∈ X n . Syrgkanis and Tardos [28] (2013) proved that a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism has price of anarchy bounded by max(µ, 1)/λ, and the average social welfare of no-regret learning outcome is also at least (λ/ max(µ, 1))Opt(v). Analogously we get: Theorem 2.6. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to a solution x, then at any Nash equilibria of the game, as well as at any no-regret learning outcome, the expected social welfare is at least max(µ,1)
Differential privacy. Differential privacy has been developed for databases storing private information for a population. A database D ∈ V n is a vector of inputs, one for each player. Two databases are i-neighbors if they differ just in the i-th coordinate. If two databases are i-neighbors for some i, they are called neighboring databases.
In the context of repeated games, every time a player leaves or arrives, the solution may change drastically. Instead of comparing the game outcomes to the socially optimal solution that changes with every player change, we will want to compare the outcome to a more stable but close to optimal solution. The notion of differential privacy offers a useful framework for this goal.
Dwork et al [2006] [13] define an algorithm as differentially private if one person's information has little influence on the outcome. In the setting of a game or mechanism the outcome for player i clearly should depend on player i's input (her claimed valuation, or source destination pair), so cannot be differentially private. The notion of joint differential privacy which has been developed by Kearns et al [18] to adapt differential privacy to settings, where the algorithm has a set of n outcomes, one for each player. We use X to denote the set of possible outcomes for one player, so an algorithm in this context is a function A : V n → X n .
If δ = 0, we say that A is ǫ-jointly differentially private.
We will see that close to optimal and jointly private solutions along with smoothness with respect to the sequence of solutions x t , can be used to show the strength of learning outcomes in our setting. Over the last the years there have been a number of algorithms developed that solve problems close to optimally in a differentially private way. See the recent book of Dwork and Roth [12] for a survey. In this paper, we will take advantage of such algorithms, including the algorithms for solving matching problems [16] and finding socially optimal routing [24] .
Marginal privacy. In recent work Kannan et al [17] introduced the weaker notion of marginal differential privacy, also in the setting when the algorithm outputs a set of n outcomes, one for each player. A mechanism is marginally differentially private if the distribution of outcomes for one player j is differentially private in the input of another player i = j, but not requiring that the combined output of all players j = i should be differentially private in ith input. Our main results continue to hold even under this weaker notion of privacy. Though since no improved approximation algorithms are known under this notion for the settings that we study, we focus on joint privacy in the main part of the paper and present the extension in Appendix B.
Price of Anarchy for Dynamic Games and Mechanisms
In this section we offer our two main theorems which follow the high level outline presented in section 1. Specifically, we formalize the connection between adaptive learning, solution-based smoothness and the existence of approximately optimal and stable solution sequences. We give this connection both in the context of cost-minimization games and in the context of mechanisms. In the next section we give an application of the framework to unit-demand matching markets and in Section 5 we provide a more canonical approach towards producing stable sequences by connecting the problem to differential privacy, along with a way we can relax the stability notion required. 
If players use an adaptive learning algorithm then: 
For shorthand, we denote this with r * i in this proof. Observe that since s * ,t i is uniquely determined by v t i and x t i , K i is a random variable that is equal to k i (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ), for each instantiation of the sequences v 1:T and x 1:T .
For any period [τ r , τ r+1 ) that the strategy s * t i is fixed, adaptive learning guarantees that the player's regret for this strategy is bounded by
Summing over the K i periods in which the strategy is fixed and using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we can bound the total regret of each i:
Thus for each instance of x 1:T and v 1:T , we have:
Adding over all players, and using the smoothness property, we get that
By Cauchy-Schwartz,
. Taking expectation over the allocation and valuation sequence and using the α-approximate optimality and Jensen's inequality:
By the k-stability of the sequence, we have that n i=1 E[K i ] ≤ k · n. By re-arranging we get the claimed bound.
An analogue of the theorem above holds for mechanisms too. The proof of the following Theorem appears in Appendix A. 
We also show an improved bound for some classes of mechanisms that satisfy an non-negative utility property and which we will use in our application in Section 4. For the case of simultaneous single-item first price auctions with unit-demand bidders it leverages the fact that by bidding only on one item at-a-time, player utilities are guaranteed to be nonnegative at all times, and only a subset of the players (e.g. at most m in the case of an m item auction) are being allocated in any feasible allocation. Under these conditions, players with no item in the feasible allocation will have no regret against a deviating strategy that attempts to "win" the empty allocation. For a general mechanism M the required Property is stated as follows: Property 1. M has an empty allocation ∅ in the allocation space. Moreover u i (s * i (v i , ∅), s −i ) = 0 and u i (s; v i ) ≥ 0 for any strategy that is used by the players. Theorem 3.4 (Improved bound for mechanisms). Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population M = (M, T, p), such that mechanism M is solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth, satisfies Property (1) and utilities are in [0, 1]. Assume that there exists a randomized sequence of solutions
If the randomized sequence satisfies an analogue of k-stability:
then:
where m is such that for any feasible allocation x, |{i :
The proof of the theorem appears in Appendix A. Removing the dependence on T . In all the theorems of this section there is a logarithmic dependence of the average regret on the time horizon T . This will lead in the efficiency theorems throughout the paper to require that the probability of change p be at most a quantity that is inversely proportional to log(T ). As we want to think of T as a really large quantity, one might argue that this dependence makes the requirements on p very harsh. However, we note that this dependence on T is not essential and is only for the simplicity of exposition. The quantity that should actually go into the regret bounds presented in this section is rather of the order of the expected lifespan of any player in the repeated game, which is of the order of 1/p. Therefore the log(T ) terms in the theorems of this section can be replaced by terms that are roughly O(log(1/p)).
In Appendix D we formalize this argument and provide a detailed proof of how to remove the dependence on T in all our theorems.
Matching Markets with Dynamic Population
In this section we consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population Γ = (M, T, p), where the stage mechanism is simultaneous first price auction with unit-demand bidders (matching markets). To apply our improved theorem, Theorem 3.4, we need two things: i) that the mechanism is allocation based (λ, µ)-smooth, and ii) that there exists a relatively stable sequence of approximately optimal solutions for the optimization problem. 
on item x i and 0 on every other item.
Remark 1. Using randomized bidding, this bound can be improved to showing that the auction is (1 − 1/e, 1)-smooth with respect to any feasible allocation vector x. It is important for us that players only consider a discrete set of bids. Using such discrete bid options, the auction can be made to be (1 − 1/e − δ, 1)-smooth for any δ > 0 by fine enough discretization of the bids.
To get a stable and approximately optimal allocation, we use a layered version of the greedy algorithm. The greedy matching algorithm considers item valuations v i (j) in decreasing order and assigns item j to player i if, when v i (j) is considered, neither item j nor player i are matched. To make this algorithm more stable we define the greedy-layered matching algorithm, which works as follows. Let ρ > 0 be the smallest non-zero value that a player has for any item. For a positive ǫ ≤ 1/3, we round each player's value down to the closest number of the form ρ(1 + ǫ) ℓ for some integer ℓ, and run the greedy algorithm with these rounded values. It is well known that the greedy algorithm guarantees a solution that is within a factor of 2 to optimal. We lose an additional factor of (1 + ǫ) by working with the rounded values.
The greedy algorithm will have many ties and we will resolve ties in a way to make the output stable.
Lemma 4.2. Consider a repeated matching market mechanism with dynamic population M = (M, T, p), with m items and n players, where ρ is the minimum possible non-zero valuation. Assuming T ≥ 1/p, the greedy layered algorithm with parameter ǫ guarantees that W (x t ; v t ) ≥ 1 2(1+ǫ) Opt(v t ) for all t, and it can be implemented so that the average (over players) expected number of changes in the allocation sequence or the type for players who hold an item at the time of the change is upper bounded by
Proof. The 2(1 + ǫ)-approximation result holds as we lose an approximation factor of 2 due to the greedy algorithm and another approximation factor of (1 + ǫ) due to the layers. To show the stability let ℓ(v i (j)) be the highest ℓ such that ℓ(v i (j)) ≥ ρ(1 + ǫ) ℓ−1 , i.e., the rounded version of v i (j) is ρ(1 + ǫ) ℓ(v i (j))−1 , which we call the layer of this value. For example, any value in the range [ρ, ρ(1 + ǫ)) is in layer 1. Let ℓ t (j) denote ℓ(v i (j)) if item j is assigned to player i at time t, and let ℓ t (j) = 0 if item j is not assigned at time t. We will use the potential function
to show stability.
We will show that changes in assignments correspond to increases in the potential function, and the potential function can only decrease due to departures.
When a player who was assigned item j leaves at time t, this immediately decreases the potential function by ℓ t (j) ≤ log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ). Next we see how to restore the layered greedy solution after a departure and after an arrival. We will claim that each change in the solution corresponds to an increase in the potential function.
To get the desired stability, we will only reassign an item j from a player i to a different player
, that is, if the rounded value is higher. If this is the case, we say that i is eligible to be reassigned to item j, and similarly, we will say that player i is eligible to be moved from an item j to a different item
When a new player i arrives, we assign the player to her highest valued item j to which she is eligible to be assigned. This increases the potential function by at least one. Now the previous owner of the item j has no allocation, and again we assign this player to her highest value item to which she is eligible to be reassigned, further increasing the potential function. We continue this process till a layered greedy solution is obtained.
After a player departs, the remaining solution may have an item j that is unassigned. We reassign item j to the eligible player i of highest value. This increases the potential function, but possibly leaves a different item, one that i used to have, unassigned. Again we assign this item to the eligible player of highest value for the item, further increasing the potential function. We continue this process till a layered greedy solution is obtained.
We have shown that each change in the assignment, other than player departures, increases the potential function Φ allowing us to bound the expected number of changes. Each step t, each of the up to m players with assigned item leaves with probability p, so the expected decrease in the potential function over the T steps of the algorithm is at most pmT log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ). The potential function Φ is nonnegative, integral, and is bounded by m log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ). This implies that the expected increase in the potential function during the algorithm is at most m(1 + pT ) log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ). Since each change in the solution also increases the potential function by at least 1, the same expression also bounds the total number of changes in the allocation and each such change affects at most two players. Thus the aggregate number of changes in allocation across players is at most 2m(1 + pT ) log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ).
Last we also need to account for the departures (or changes in type) of players that are already allocated an item. Since there are m such players in each iteration and each is replaced with probability p, there are mpT such changes in expectation. Thus the total number of changes in allocation or changes in type of players that are allocated an item is at most m(2+3pT ) log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ). The average change for a player is an nth fraction of this, leading to the claimed bound using that T ≥ 1/p. In the simultaneous first price auction mechanism with dynamic population and unit-demand bidders, if all bidders use adaptive learning algorithms and if T ≥ 1 p we have:
where N is the number of different strategies considered by a player. If in addition we assume that all items get allocated at each round for the minimum value of ρ, or that the average optimal welfare in each round is at least mρ, that is 1
≥ mρ, then we can also get a purely multiplicative bound:
if the turnover probability p is at most
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.4, where x 1:T is the outcome of the greedy-layered mechanism; the fact that first price auction is ( 1 2 , 1)-smooth by Lemma 4.1; and that there is a stable close to optimal solution by Lemma 4.2 to get that:
Using that pT > 1, we get the first claimed bound.
To get the multiplicative bound, it suffices to upper bound the expected aggregate regret by
, which is at least ǫ 4(1+ǫ) T mρ, by the assumptions ǫ ≤ 1/3 and that each item is allocated for a value of ρ. To show that this is true, what we need to prove is the following (using the inequality (14)):
.
Remark 2. An interesting feature of Theorem 4.3 is that the probability p is independent of the number of players n and the number of items m, implying that the game can accommodate extremely high turnover in player population, as the number of players increases, without losing in the quality of the outcome. The probability p required for the high quality solution, needs to depend only on log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ), log N and log T , where N can be bounded by O(log(m/ρ)) if we further assume that each player only considers bids that are at least small constant factor apart and since we assumed that bidders submit a non-zero bid for only one of the items. The high-level intuition why the greedy algorithm can sustain such a rate of change is as follows: At any time-step the only players that incur any non-zero regret are the players to whom the greedy solution currently allocates some item. Since the optimal welfare is at least m · ρ, if we want the efficiency to be ǫ close to what is implied by having absolutely no regret for the greedy layered algorithm we need the total regret in the system to be at most ǫ · m · ρ. In other words, we need the regret associated with each item to be at most ǫ · ρ. Now observe that when an item is allocated to a player in the highest level, i.e. with a value in [ 1 (1+ǫ) , 1], then this player is never unassigned from that item until he leaves the game. Thus we can roughly 2 view the lifetime of an item as decomposing into p · T cycles such that during each cycle the item transitions from level-1 players to level-log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ) players. In other words, the lifetime of an item splits in roughly pT log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ) stable allocation intervals, leading to average interval length (p log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ)) −1 and thereby average regret at most p · log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ). Since we want this regret to be at most ǫ · ρ, we get p ≤ ρ 2 ǫ 2 log (1+ǫ) (1/ρ) which is essentially the bound we have in Theorem 4.3.
Stable Sequences via Differential Privacy
In this section we formally connect joint differential privacy with the construction of stable sequences needed by our main Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. In Appendix B we offer a strengthening of these theorems that allows us to use marginal differential privacy. Differential privacy offers a general framework to find solutions that are close to optimal, yet more stable to changes in the input than the optimum itself. To guarantee privacy, the output of the algorithm is required to depend only minimally on any player's input. This is exactly what we need in our framework.
Theorem 5.1 (Stable sequences via privacy). Suppose there exists an algorithm A : V n → ∆(X n ) that is (ǫ, δ)-jointly differentially private, takes as input a valuation profile v and outputs a distribution of solutions such that a sample from this distribution is feasible with probability 1 − β, and is α-approximately efficient in expectation (for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, α > 1 and δ, β > 0). Consider a sample v 1:T from the distribution of valuations produced by the adversary in a repeated cost-minimization game with dynamic population Γ = (G, p, T ). There exists a randomized sequence of solutions x 1:T for the sequence v 1:T , such that for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , x t conditional on v t is an α-approximation to Opt(v t ) in expectation and the joint randomized sequence (v 1:T , x 1:T ) is pT (1 + n(2ǫ + 2β + δ))-stable (as in Definition 3.1).
We defer the proof of Theorem 5.1 to the next subsection. Combining Theorem 5.1 with Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2. Consider a repeated cost game with dynamic population Γ = (G, T, p), such that the stage game G is allocation based (λ, µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1 p . Assume that there exists an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm A : V n → X n with error parameter β that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.1. If all players use adaptive learning in the repeated game then the overall cost of the solution is at most:
Similarly for a mechanism we get:
Proof. By Theorem 3.2 and using the stable sequence generated by Theorem 5.1 we get:
Using that 1 ≤ pT we get the claimed bound. Similarly the result follows for mechanisms.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
We will use total variation distance to measure the distance between distributions. For two distributions µ and η on some finite probability space Ω the following are two equivalent versions of the total variation distance:
where in the 1-norm in the middle we think of µ and η as a vector of probabilities over the possible outcomes.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that A : V n → ∆(X n ) is an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm with failure probability β (for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2 and δ, β > 0) that takes as input a valuation profile v and outputs a distribution over feasible solutions σ. Let σ and σ ′ be the algorithm's outputs on two inputs v and v ′ that differ only in coordinate i. Then we can bound the total variation distance between σ −i and σ ′
Proof. Condition (3) of joint differential privacy guarantees that if we let S ⊆ X n −i be a subset of possible solutions for players other than i and with σ −i (S) and σ ′ −i (S) the probability that the two distributions assign on S, then for any S:
Thus by the second definition of the total variation distance in Equation (16) 
To facilitate the proof we need a simple lemma from basic probability theory.
Lemma 5.4 (Coupling Lemma). Let µ and η be two probability measures over a finite set Ω. There is a coupling ω of (µ, η), such that if the random variable (X, Y ) is distributed according to ω, then the marginal distribution on X is µ, the marginal distribution on Y is η, and
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose that A : V n → ∆(X n ) is an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm as described in the definition of the theorem. The differentially private algorithm fails with probability β. We will denote with σ the output distribution over solutions for an input v, where we use the optimal solution in the low probability event that the algorithm fails. (Equivalently A could be a randomized algorithm and σ its implicit distribution over solutions). Let σ 1 , . . . , σ T , be the sequence of distributions output by the private algorithm when run on a deterministic sequence of valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v T with the modification described in the paragraph above. To simplify the discussion we will assume that only one player changes valuation at each time-step t. Essentially we are breaking every transition from time-step t to t + 1 into many sequential transitions where only one player changes at every time step, and then deleting the solutions from the resulting sequence that correspond to the added steps. Thus the number of steps within this proof should be thought as being equal to n · p · T in expectation.
By differential privacy we know that the total variation distance of two consecutive distributions without the modification of replacing failures with the optimal solution is at most 2ǫ + δ. Since, by the union bound, the probability that any of the two consecutive runs of the algorithm fail is at most 2β, we can show that the total variation distance of the latter modified output is at most 2ǫ + δ + 2β, i.e. for any t ∈ [T ]: d tv (σ t+1 −i , σ t −i ) ≤ 2ǫ + δ + 2β (see Lemma 5.5 for a formal proof). We can turn the sequence of distributions σ 1 , . . . , σ T into a distribution of sequences of allocations x 1:T by coupling the randomness used to select the solutions in different distributions σ t .
To do this, we take advantage of the coupling lemma from probability theory, Lemma 5.4. If at step t no player changes values, then σ t = σ t+1 , and we select the same outcome from the two distributions, so we get P[x t −i = x t+1 −i ] = 0. Now consider a step in which a player i changes her private type v i . We use Lemma 5.4 to couple x t+1 −i and x t −i so that 3
Note that this couples the ith coordinate x t+1 i and x t i in an arbitrary manner, which is fine, as we assumed that the valuation of player i changes at this step.
We have defined a probability distribution of sequences x 1:T for every fixed sequence of valuations v 1:T . We extend this definition to random sequences of valuation in the natural way adding the distribution of valuations v 1:T .
We claim that the resulting random sequences of (valuation,solution) pairs satisfies the statement of the theorem: the α-approximation follows by the guarantees of the private algorithm and by the fact that we use the optimal solution when the algorithm fails. Next we argue about the stability of the sequence. Consider a player i, and the distribution of her sequence (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ). In each step t her valuation v t i changes with probability p contributing pT in expectation to the number of changes. In a step t when some other value j = i changes, we use (17) to bound the probability that x t i = x t+1 i by 2ǫ + δ + 2β. Thus any change in the value of some other player j contributes (2ǫ + 2β + δ) to the expectation of the number of changes for player i. The expected number of such changes in other values is (n − 1)pT over the sequence, showing that the sequence is pT + (n − 1)pT (2ǫ + 2β + δ) ≤ pT (1 + n(2ǫ + 2β + δ)) stable, as claimed.
Lemma 5.5. Let q and q ′ be the output of an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm with failure probability β, on two valuation profiles v and v ′ that differ only in coordinate i. Let σ and σ ′ be the modified output where the outcome is replaced with optimal outcome when the algorithm fails. Then:
Proof. Consider two random coupled random variables y, y ′ that are implied by Lemma 5.4 applied to distributions q and q ′ , such that y ∼ q and y ′ ∼ q ′ and Pr [y = y ′ ] = d tv (q, q ′ ) ≤ 2ǫ + δ (by (ǫ, δ)-joint privacy). Now consider two other random variables x and x ′ where x = y except for the cases where y is an outcome of a failure in which case x is equal to the welfare optimal outcome and similarly for x ′ and y ′ . Obviously: x ∼ σ and x ′ ∼ σ ′ , thus (x, x ′ ) is a valid coupling for distributions σ and σ ′ . Thus if we show that P r[x = x ′ ] ≤ 2ǫ + δ + 2β, then by properties of total variation distance d tv (σ, σ ′ ) ≤ P r[x = x ′ ] ≤ 2ǫ + δ + 2β, which is the property we want to show. Let fail be the event that either y or y ′ is the outcome of a failed run of the algorithm. Then by the union bound Pr [fail] ≤ 2β. Thus we have:
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Large Congestion Games with Dynamic Population
Our first application of differential privacy is for the atomic congestion game with dynamic population, defined in Section 2. Rogers et al [24] gives a jointly differentially private algorithm for finding an optimal solution in congestion games, called Private gradient descent algorithm. They focus on routing games due to the paper's focus on tolls as mediators, but their algorithm works in full generality for any atomic congestion game. As a first application, we illustrate our technique with linear latencies ℓ e (x) = a e x + b e . We assume latency is monotone increasing, i.e., a e > 0 for all e ∈ E and that b e ≥ 0. The algorithm of Rogers et al [24] assumes that ℓ e (x) ≤ 1 for all e. To achieve this we need to scale latencies by n max e (a e + b e ). This makes the functions γ-Lipschitz for γ = 1/n. For this case, the algorithm outputs an integer solution that satisfies (ǫ, δ) joint differential privacy, and has an error probability of β for parameters ǫ, δ, β > 0, and for player types v with probability 1 − β returns a solution x with cost in expectation over the randomization of the algorithm
We can combine this differentially private algorithm with Corollary 5.2 for a class of latency functions ℓ(x) that we have good smoothness properties. The class of linear latencies ℓ e (x) = a e x+b e are (5/3, 1/3)-smooth [8, 3, 25] . The same proof also gives: 
assuming the probability p of departures is at most:
O min e a e max e (a e + b e ) η 4 · m 10 log 2 (m · n) ln(n) −1 · 1 ln T Remark 3. We note that the probability p depends mainly on the number of congestible elements m, but depends on n only in a polylogarithmic way. For large n, almost a constant fraction of the player population can turn over at each step.
Proof. To use the jointly differentially private algorithm of Rogers et al [24] with a set of affine latency functions ℓ e (x e ) = a e x e + b e , we need to scale them by n max e (a e + b e ) to guarantee that ℓ e (n) ≤ 1 as required. This makes the functions γ = 1/n-Lipschitz. We will use the jointly differentially private algorithm on the scaled problem, with privacy parameters ǫ(n), δ(n), and β(n) that will depend on the size of the population, and then rescale to the original costs, to get a solution with expected cost: 4 4 More precisely, the authors proved that they can find a fractional solution with cost at most Opt+R+4R for R ≤ E[C(x; v)] ≤ Opt(v)+141n 1/2 ·m·(max(nγ, m)) 1/2 ·ǫ −1/2 ·log (4m · n · max(nγ, m) · ǫ/β)· ln(1/δ) where γ = 1/n, and the polylog term is the actual expression in (19) . Corollary 5.2 is expecting an α-approximation algorithm, so we need to bound the approximation factor of this algorithm. To claim that it is a (1 + η 2 )-approximation algorithm we need to guarantee that 141m 3/2 √ n ǫ(n) log(4m 2 nǫ(n)/β(n)) ln(1/δ(n))) · n max e (a e + b e ) ≤ η 2 Opt.
A simple lower bound on the optimal solution is Opt ≥ n min e a e n/m = n 2 m min e a e , assuming all players are congesting at least one elements. 5 Using this lower bound, and rearranging terms, we can guarantee the desired approximation bound by assuming that n ≥ 141m 3/2 ǫ(n) log(4m 2 nǫ(n)/β(n)) ln(1/δ(n))) · max e (a e + b e ) · 2m η min e a e 2 (20) To use this solution as a benchmark in Corollary 5.2, we need a small enough ǫ(n) and δ(n) as each person leaving and arriving causes the benchmark solution to change for an O(ǫ(n) + β(n) + δ(n)) fraction of the population in expectation. We will let δ(n), β(n) = ǫ(n)/3 and set ǫ(n) as small as is allowed by Equation (20) . Since ǫ(n)/β(n) = 3 and δ(n) = ǫ(n)/3, we need: , and observe that f (n) = poly(m, log(n)). The latter inequality is satisfied if 6 :
Moreover, by the latter parameters we also have that ǫ(n) + β(n) + δ(n) ≤ 5 3 ǫ(n). Now applying Corollary 5.2 to the problem scaled by m · n max e (a e + b e ) to guarantee the assumption ℓ e (x) ≤ 1, that the loss functions for every player are bounded by 1, and scaling back, we get that
(a e + b e ) · n · m 5 Consider the cost minimization problem assuming the latency function of all edges is replaced with the latencŷ l(x) = x · mine ae. The value of the original cost minimization problem is at least the value of this new one. The social cost in this new problem is simply: mine ae · e x 2 e . Since each player congests at least one edge the solution must satisfy the constraint: e xe ≥ n. By the convexity and symmetry of the objective function, the latter relaxed problem achieves a minimum when all xe are identical and equal to n/m in which case the value is n 2 m mine ae. 6 If we set: ǫ(n) = 1 n f (n) · ln(3n) then: ln(3/ǫ(n)) = ln(3n) − ln(f (n)) − ln ln(3n) ≤ ln(3n). Thus: ǫ(n) = 1 n f (n) · ln(3n) ≥ 1 n f (n) · ln(3/ǫ(n)).
To get the desired bound, we need to make sure that the additive error is bounded by a small multiple of Opt. Concretely, we need:
Using again the n 2 m min e a e ≤ Opt(v t ) lower bound for the cost in each step t, we will now show that we can guarantee this with the choice of p suggested in the theorem. With no loss of generality we can assume that ǫ(n)n > 3 (since it holds if m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2), it suffices to show the following:
Finally, we use that the number of player strategies N in a congestion game with m elements is clearly bounded by N ≤ 2 m , and hence ln(N T ) ≤ m ln T . Using this fact, we can rearrange the above inequality, and guarantee the required inequality if have
· (min e a e ) 2 (max e (a e + b e )) 2 · η 2 2 · 1 log 2 (12m 2 n) ln(3n)m 10 ln T
(min e a e ) max e (a e + b e ) · η 4 · 1 log 2 (12m 2 n) ln(3n)m 10 ln T The latter completes the proof of the theorem.
In Appendix C we generalize the bound to polynomial functions, and also give additive error results for congestion games with general latency functions.
Large Markets with Dynamic Population
Next we revisit the first price auction game, but consider a much broader class of valuations: we consider large markets with valuations that satisfy the gross substitute property. Hsu et al [16] give a jointly differentially private algorithm to find close to optimal allocation in markets where buyers have the gross substitute property, and there are enough copies of each item. This algorithm will allow us to derive good welfare guarantees for outcomes on adaptive learning in repeated auctions with dynamic population using Corollary 5.2.
We will assume that the valuation functions satisfy the gross substitute property, i.e., increasing prices outside a subset doesn't decrease the player's demand in the set.
Definition 5.8 (Gross-substitute valuation). For a price p let p(A) = j∈A p j denote the total price, and let ω(p) denote the player's most desirable set of goods, that is, let ω(p) = arg max A v(A)− p(A). The valuation satisfies the gross substitutes condition if for every pair of price vectors (p, p ′ ) such that ∀ items j p j ≤ p ′ j and for every set of goods S ∈ ω(p) if S ′ ⊆ S satisfies p ′ j = p j for every j ∈ S ′ then there is a set S * ∈ ω(p ′ ) with S ′ ⊆ S * .
We will make the following large market assumptions:
1. The number of items ms is large, in particular ms ≥ cn for some constant c ≤ 1. 2. In the optimal solution each item can be assigned for at least ρ marginal gain. This implies immediately that the optimal social welfare is at least Opt t ≥ ρms at each time t ∈ [T ]. 3. The players are interested in at most d items (meaning that their value for any bundle A of items is equal to the maximum value among any subset of this bundle with cardinality at most d).
We will use the PAlloc algorithm from Hsu et al [16] as our benchmark for adaptive learning. The algorithm has two additional parameters α > 0 and β > 0, it is ǫ-jointly differentially private, that is (ǫ, 0)-jointly differentially private and with probability (1 − β) it computes a feasible efficient allocation. Assuming the supply s is high enough, the social value of the allocation is at least Opt − α · max(ms, n) in expectation, where recall that ms is the total supply, as we have s copies of m different items each. Concretely, with supply s we get
In order to be able to use this algorithm as a benchmark in Corollary 5.2, we need to show that this is an approximation algorithm with small approximation factor. Lemma 5.9. For every η > 1, when the players' valuations satisfy the gross substitute assumption, the algorithm PAlloc with privacy parameter ǫ(n) can be used to output an allocation, w.p. 1− β(n), that has social welfare at least (1− η 2 )Opt under the large market assumptions listed above, assuming in addition that
Proof. Algorithm PAlloc with parameter α, finds, w.p. 1 − β, a feasible solution with social welfare at least 7 :
W (x; v) ≥ Opt − α · max(ms, 2n) w.p. 1 − β, assuming (21) holds. We will use the ρms ≥ ρ · c · max{ms,2n} 2 lower bound on Opt, by the two first large market assumptions. Now setting α = η 2 · c·ρ 2 with c from the first large market assumption, we get that:
as required. For a given supply s, the bound from Equation (21) required is exactly the one claimed in the lemma.
Theorem 5.10. Consider a repeated large market mechanism with dynamic population Γ = (M, T, p), such that T ≥ 1 p where the stage mechanism M is a first price auction where the players have gross substitute valuations, and the market satisfies the large assumption. If all players use an adaptive regret algorithm, and the auction is (λ, µ)-smooth, then the overall expected social welfare is at least:
The algorithm assumes ms > n and gives an additive error bound of α · ms. If ms < n, we run PAlloc with an extra m ′ items such that (m ′ + m)s = a for some a ∈ [n, n + s]. For all the extra items every player has valuation 0 and, by the way the algorithm works, no user gets extra item in the algorithm's allocation. Applying the algorithm we have an error bound of α(m + m ′ )s ≤ α · (n + s) ≤ α · 2n.
if the probability p of a player leaving is
where N is the number of different strategies each player is using.
Remark 4. If we assume that each player can bid for at most d items, and considers bidding only values that are constant factor apart, then the number of possible bids to N = O(m d log(1/ρ) d ), and we get that the probability depends mainly on the parameters of the problem, d, and the number of different items, and does not depend on the number of players. For large n, and large supply, almost a constant fraction of the player population can turn over at each step.
Proof. We apply Lemma 5.9 with a ǫ(n) = β(n) that satisfy the condition, i.e., set
By Corollary 5.2 and Lemma 5.9, we have:
In order to lower bound the second term by
t Opt t , we bound Opt t ≥ ρms as before, and then it suffices to prove the following:
Using the assumption that ms ≥ cn, and rearranging terms this is ensured by:
Assuming wlog that n · ǫ(n) ≥ 1 and rearranging terms again, we get that this is ensured by
Using the assumption that ms ≥ cn, this is implied by the condition of the theorem assumed.
There are several algorithms for this setting that are (λ, µ)-smooth. For instance, running a separate first price auction for each unit simultaneously is (1 − 1/e, 1)-solution based smooth, via similar arguments as those used in [28] . Another (1 − 1/e, 1)-solution based smooth auction is that of running simultaneously and separately a first price multi-unit auction for selling the units of each type of good. A Omitted Proofs from Section 3 Theorem 3.3 Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population M = (M, T, p), such that mechanism M is allocation-based (λ, µ)-smooth. Suppose that v 1:T and x 1:T is a k-stable sequence, such that x t is feasible (pointwise) and α-approximately optimal (in-expectation) for each t, i.e.
Proof. Let s 
For shorthand, we will denote this as r * i in this proof. Following exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can show that for each instance of v 1:T and x 1:T :
We sum the latter inequality over all players and take expectation over v 1:T and x 1:T . Then we apply Cauchy-Schwartz and Jensen inequalities and the k-stability of the sequence, i.e., i E[K i ] ≤ k · n:
By the definition of regret for each instance of x 1:T and v 1:T , we have:
Summing over all players and using the smooth mechanism property, we get that
By re-arranging and using the fact that W (s t ;
Taking expectation over the allocation and valuation sequence and using the α-approximate optimality and Inequality (24):
If µ ≤ 1 we get the Theorem, since revenue is non-negative. If µ > 1, we will show that total revenue is approximately bounded from above by welfare. Specifically, we will show that:
The latter is equivalent to showing:
We use the fact that players can always play the empty strategy ∅ i of exiting the mechanism and receiving zero utility. Thus it suffices to bound the expected average per player regret with respect to this empty fixed strategy. Define ∅ 1:T i the sequence of fixed empty strategies and denote r ∅ i = r i (∅ 1;T , s 1:T ; v 1:T ). Then, using the no-regret definition with respect to this empty strategy for each player i:
Hence, for what we want to show, it suffices:
Observe that since this strategy and the type of each player i are fixed in the intervals defined by the changes accounted for in k i (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ), from the exact same reasoning as what we used to bound r * i , we can also derive that for each instance of v 1:T and x 1:T :
and thereby similarly as in Inequality (24) we get the desired property given in Equation (26) . Hence, we get that:
Dividing over by µ yields the Theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population M = (M, T, p), such that mechanism M is allocation based (λ, µ)-smooth and satisfies Property (1) . Assume that there exists a randomized sequence of solutions x 1:T = {x 1 , . . . , x T } and types v 1:T = {v 1 , . . . , v T }, such that x t is feasible (pointwise) and α-approximately optimal (in-expectation) for each t, i.e.
For each player i, let κ i (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ) be the number of times that x t i = x t+1 i or (x t i = ∅ and v t i = v t+1 i ). 8 If the randomized sequence satisfies an analogue of k-stability:
Proof. Let s * ,1:T i , K i and r i (s * ,1:T i , s 1:T ; v 1:T ) be defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, including the shorthand of r * i . For any period [τ r , τ r+1 ) that the strategy s * ,t i is fixed, adaptive learning guarantees that the player's regret for this strategy is bounded by
Moreover, if in period r, x t i = ∅, then by Assumption 1 we have that: R i (τ r , τ r+1 ) ≤ 0. Thus, if we denote with X i,r the indicator of whether in period r, x t i = ∅, we get:
Summing over the K i + 1 periods in which the strategy is fixed and using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we can bound the total regret of each i:
. Then observe that: Replacing in the previous inequality, summing over all players and using Cauchy-Swartz:
Since each x t is a feasible allocation:
Now observe that for each instance of (v 1:T , x 1:T ):
T , x 1:T ), since the latter summation sums all changes in type or allocation ranging from r = 1 to K i , such that the allocation x τr i in the period right before the r-th change is non-empty. This is at most the set of changes that are accounted in κ i (v 1:T , x 1:T ). It is an inequality as there could be an index r at which both a type and an allocation is changing and the summation only accounts it once, while κ i (v 1:T , x 1:T ) counts it twice, or there could be changes where x t i = x t−1 i and x t i = ∅, which are not accounted in the above, but are accounted in κ i (v 1:T , x 1:T ). Combining all the above we get:
By the no-regret property of each player, for each instance of x 1:T and v 1:T , we have:
Adding over all players, and using the smoothness property and the bound on the sum of regrets, we get that
Taking expectation over the allocation and valuation sequence and using the α-approximate optimality and Jensen's inequality:
By the analogue of k-stability of the sequence, as defined in Equation (27), we have that
By re-arranging and using the fact that W (s t ; v t ) = i u i (s t ; v t )+R(s t ) and that R(s t ) ≤ W (s t ; v t ) (since utilities are non-negative), we get the claimed bound.
B Stable Sequences via Marginal Privacy
Here we extend the Corollary 5.2 to use a weaker form of privacy, marginal differential privacy, showing that results on marginal differential privacy would have sufficed for our main results from Section 5. This weaker form of privacy may make it easier to prove the existence of approximately optimal private solutions. We first state marginal privacy formally and then prove the extension of our results. [17] ) An algorithm M : C n → G n is (ǫ, δ)-marginally differentially private if for every i, for every pair of i-neighbors D, D ′ ∈ C n , every other player j = i, and for every subset of outputs S ⊆ G for player j.
If δ = 0, we say that M is ǫ-marginally differentially private.
Similar to joint privacy, we will allow for our algorithms to have a failure probability β, with which they either return a very inefficient solution or an infeasible solution.
Theorem B.2. Consider a repeated cost game with dynamic population Γ = (G, T, p), such that the stage game G is allocation-based (λ, µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1 p . Assume that there exists an (ǫ, δ)marginal differentially private algorithm A : V n → X n with failure probability β that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.1. If all players use adaptive learning in the repeated game then the overall cost of the solution is at most:
Proof outline. The proof follows roughly the same outline as the proof of Corollary 5.2 (which used Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 3.2). The outline of the changes needed is as follows.
1. The notion of marginal privacy is not strong enough to allow the kind of global coupling offered by Theorem 5.1. Instead, we can couple the distributions (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ) separately for each player i, while ensuring that each sequence has expected number of changes in either her solution or type at most p · T (1 + n(2ǫ + δ)). 2. With no global coupling of solutions, we cannot directly use Theorem 3.2. Rather we need to prove that the stable coupling of distributions of each player's value and outcome individually is strong enough to reach the same conclusion.
We note that, while we can prove Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 without the need for global coupling, Theorem 3.4, requiring Property 1, does need the global coupling used there.
We state the claims used by the two steps, and offer a sketch of how to modify the proves used so far to prove the claims.
Lemma B.3 (Stable sequences via marginal privacy).
Suppose that there exists an algorithm A : V n → X n that is (ǫ, δ)-marginal differentially private algorithm, takes as input a valuation profile v and outputs a distribution such that a sample from this distribution is feasible with probability 1 − β, and is an α-approximately efficient in expectation (for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1/2, α > 1 and δ, β > 0).
Consider the sequence of valuations v 1:T produced by the adversary in a repeated cost-minimization game with dynamic population Γ = (G, p, T ), and let σ 1:T be the sequence of the resulting outcome distributions produced by algorithm A. Then there exists a randomized sequence of solutions x 1:T i for each player i, such that for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , conditional on v t for each i the distribution of (v t i , x t i ) is the ith marginal distribution of an α-approximation to Opt(v t ), and the distribution of the sequences (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ) is such that the expected number of changes in i's solution or type is at most p · T 1 + n(2ǫ + 2β + δ) for each player i.
Proof. This is an application of the coupling Lemma 5.4 for each distribution σ i , where we use the optimal solution in the low probability event that the marginally differentially private algorithm fails. Using the notation from the proof of Theorem 5.1, marginal privacy bounds the effect of a change in valuation of player j = i on the distribution σ i . Note that there is no requirement that coupling is coordinated between the different coordinates, so the resulting distribution of sequences (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ) cannot be viewed as a distribution of global sequences (v 1:T , x 1:T ).
Next we prove the analog of Theorem 3.2, which will finish our proof of Theorem B.2.
Theorem B.4 (Improved main theorem for cost-minimization games). Consider a repeated cost game with dynamic population Γ = (G, T, p), such that the stage game G is allocation-based (λ, µ)smooth. Suppose D 1:T is a sequence of solution distributions, such that the solution in D t has cost at most α times the minimum possible cost Opt(v t ) in expectation, and suppose the marginal distributions D 1:T i can be though of as a randomized sequence of solutions x 1:T i for each player i, such that the distribution of the sequences (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ) has expected number of changes in i's solution or type at most k. If players use an adaptive learning algorithm then:
Proof. We follow the outline of the proof of Theorem 3.2 till equation (9) . Then take expectation of the resulting inequality to get
which finishes the proof.
We can prove the analogous theorems for mechanisms as well.
Theorem B.5 (Improved main theorem for mechanisms). Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population M = (M, T, p), such that mechanism M is allocation-based (λ, µ)-smooth. Suppose σ 1:T is a sequence of solution distributions, such that the solution in σ t has social welfare at least an α fraction of the maximum possible value Opt(v t ) in expectation, and suppose the marginal distributions σ 1:T i can be though of as a randomized sequence of solutions x 1:T i for each player i, such that the distribution of the sequences (v 1:T i , x 1:T i ) has expected number of changes in i's solution or type at most k for each player i. If players use an adaptive learning algorithm then:
T · (k + 1) · ln(N T ).
n d max e d j=0 a e,j . Recall that for affine latencies, this upper bound was n max e (a e + b e ) so here we are using its natural extension to polynomials of degree d.
This scaling down also makes the latencies d/n-Lipschitz, as required by the algorithm: ℓ e (n) − ℓ e (n − 1) n d max e d j=0 a e,j ≤ n d − (n − 1) d · max e d j=0 a e,j n d max e d j=0 a e,j ≤ d · n d−1 n d = d n
Similarly with the affine case, to claim that this is a (1 + η 2 )-approximation algorithm, we need to guarantee that 141m 3/2 √ nd ǫ(n) log 4m 2 ndǫ(n)/β(n) ln 1/δ(n) · n d max e d j=0 a e,j ≤ η 2 Opt
The lower bound we will use for the optimum is: Opt ≥ n min e a e,d n m d = n d+1 m d min e a e,d again assuming that each player congests at least one elements, and using the fact that all latency functions are degree d. Hence, the desired approximation bound is guaranteed for: n ≥ 141m 3/2 √ d ǫ(n) log 4m 2 ndǫ(n)/β(n) ln 1/δ(n) · 2m d η min e a e,d 2
The rest of the proof goes as the proof of Theorem 5.7 replacing ǫ(n) and the upper and lower bounds accordingly.
General Congestion Games
We can use algorithm in the proof of Corollary 5.2 for general congestion games satisfying the conditions of Rogers et al [24] , and we get the following Theorem.
Theorem C.2. Consider a repeated congestion game with dynamic population Γ = (G, T, p), such that the stage game G is allocation based (λ, µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1 p . Assume the game satisfies the conditions above. For any parameters ǫ, δ, β > 0, if all players use adaptive learning in the repeated game then the overall cost of the solution is at most:
Opt(v t ) + nmT 1 − µÕ p(1 + n(ǫ + β + δ)) + λm 1/2 γ 1/2 ǫ −1/2 where theÕ is a polylog term in N, T, ǫ, 1/δ, 1/β, n, m.
Proof. A small technical difficulty in using the proof of Corollary 5.2 in a black box form is that Corollary 5.2, as well as the main Theorem 3.2 used to prove it, are stated with multiplicative error bounds. However, using the additive error in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we get the following, where v t is the type vector of players, s t is the strategy vector played at time t, and x t is the allocation that the differentially private algorithm generates. The assumption for congestion games was that each individual latency is bounded by 1. Dividing each latency function by m, the number of edges to make the total latency bounded by 1, or equivalently scaling down the error bounds from Adding the bound for the quality of the solution x, and rearranging terms we get the claimed bound.
D Removing the dependence on T
In our results presented so far, we have a logarithmic dependence on the total time T the game is played. Here we show that with a more careful analysis this dependence is not needed.
Theorem D.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, the bound can be replaced by:
for all κ ∈ (0, n/e) Proof. In the proof of Theorem 3.2, the dependence on the total time T , shows up in equation (7) bounding the regret of a player over time. The bound on regret is derived from Theorem 2.2 of Luo and Shapire [21] where regret over an interval of time [τ i , τ 2 ) is bounded with τ 2 inside the logarithm. In equation (7) we used the upper bound τ 2 ≤ T for all the regret terms. If all players in our game live at most T max steps, we can bound the total regret of the players in one position i (using the shorthand r * i from the proof of Theorem 3.2) as:
With a high enough T max , only a very small fraction of the players will live more than T max steps.
To bound the overall regret without any assumption on how long players can live, we can bound the regret of such long living players by 1 in each step. Let L t i denote the random event that at time t player i has been alive for more than T max steps for a value of T max that we will set later. Let also L i,t correspond to the indicator random variable of the event L t i . Following the proof of Theorem 3.2, and bounding regret by 1 for each player i at any step t that L t i occurs, we get the following bound.
(37) To prove the theorem, we set T max = 2 ln(n/κ) p , and we will show that this suffices to get E i,t L i,t ≤ κT , which finishes the proof. To bound the expected value of the sum E [ t L i,t ] for a given player i, divide the sequence of T time steps into intervals I j of length T max /2. For any interval I j , let B i,j denote the event that player i doesn't change value throughout this interval, and note that the probability of this event is bounded by Pr [B i,j ] = (1 − p) Tmax/2 . Now note that, if L i,t = 1, i.e. player i has lived more than T max steps at some time t ∈ I j , there exists a sequence of at most one contiguous intervals ending at I j−1 such that player i has not changed value. We will say that player i at time t is associated with the first interval in this sequence. Note that, with this process, every player i at some time step t with L i,t = 1 is associated to at most one interval I j where a bad event occurs.
Hence, E i,t L i,t is at most the expected number of steps t when player i is associated with an interval where a bad event occurred.
To get the claimed bound, we note the following facts:
for A = O min e a e max e (a e + b e ) η 4 · m 10 log 2 (m · n) ln(n) −1 and B = 2 ln(n/κ) > 1.
We argue that p ≤ A 2 log(2B/A) implies Inequality 38 and hence is a sufficient upper bound on the probability p. Observe that the function g(p) = p log(B/p) is monotone increasing in the region p ∈ [0, B/e]. Wlog in this analysis assume that p < 1/e, hence the latter monotonicity holds in this range, since B > 1. Moreover, we might as well assume that Proof. The proof of the first part of the theorem has the same steps as the proof of Theorem D.1, hence we omit it. For the second part, the proof is also the same albeit invoking the proof of Theorem 3.4 to replace n with m. The main difference, for the latter result is that, under Property 1, it suffices to set T max = 2 ln(m/κ), as in the second term we add at most m T Tmax/2 summands. Hence, we can totally remove the dependence on n.
Corollary D.4. Theorem 5.10 continues to hold with an extra η multiplicative loss in the welfare, even under the weaker requirement that the probability of departure is at most: O 
